Inherent in providing healthcare for youth lie tensions among best interests, decision-making capacity, rights, and legal authority. Transgender youth experience barriers to needed gender-affirming care, often rooted in ethical and legal issues, such as healthcare provider concerns regarding youth capacity and rights to consent to hormone therapy. Even when decision-making capacity is present, youth may lack the legal authority to give consent. The aims of this paper are therefore to provide an empirical analysis of minor trans youth capacity to consent (...) to hormone therapy and to address the normative question of whether there is ethical justification for granting trans youth the authority to consent to this care. Through qualitative content analysis of interviews with trans youth, parents, and healthcare providers, we found that trans youth demonstrated the understandings and abilities characteristic of the capacity to consent to hormone therapy and that they did consent to hormone therapy with positive outcomes. Employing deontological and consequentialist reasoning and drawing on a foundation of empirical evidence, human rights, and best interests we conclude that granting trans youth with decisional capacity both the right and the legal authority to consent to hormone therapy via the informed consent model of care is ethically justified. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.

Mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge (or normative knowledge more generally) can seem intuitively puzzling in similar ways. For example, taking apparent human knowledge of either domain at face value can seem to require accepting that we benefited from some massive and mysterious coincidence. In the mathematical case, a pluralist partial response to access worries has been widely popular. In this paper, I will develop and address a worry, suggested by some works in the recent literature like (Clarke-Doane, 2020), that connections (...) between ought facts and action prevent us from giving a similarly pluralist response to moral access worries. (shrink)

I propose that the ‘post-truth condition’, i.e., the vulnerability of our institutions for establishing and negotiating what is true and worth knowing, is not primarily a pathology, a susceptibility to external manipulation or coercion, as tends to be stressed in the literature, but has first and foremost to do with the unraveling of certain epistemic assumptions. In analogy with T.S. Eliot’s modernist notion that the attempt to capture and concretize an experience or a state of mind requires ‘objective correlatives’ which (...) it conveys, I argue that the trope of post-truth to express the embattled status of expertise can be understood in terms of failed symbolization. In the second section, I spell out what this means in terms of Donald Davidson’s discussion of the problem of defining truth. In the last section, I propose a ‘poetics of political theory’ for understanding the post-truth condition. (shrink)

This article works from 10th anniversary reporting on the Montréal massacre and its legacy, arguing that the public memory of the massacre, far from being settled, is charged with ambivalence. It is argued that such ambivalence is an effect of the limits of remembrance as a `strategic practice', which has circumscribed sustained encounters with the loss(es) of the massacre. Ambivalence is read in the article as both a limit and resource for feminists interested in re-opening the question of the massacre's (...) public memory for the next decade of memorial-activism. (shrink)

Classical philosophical Daoism and ecofeminism converge on key points. Ecofeminism’s critique of Western dualistic metaphysics finds support in Daoism’s nondualistic, particularist, cosmological framework, which distinguishes pairs of complementary opposites within a process of dynamic transformation without committing itself to a binary, essentialist position as regards sex and gender. Daoism’s epistemological implications suggest a link to ecofeminism’s alignment with a situational and provisional model of knowledge. As a transformative philosophy, the cluster of concepts that give specificity to the Daoist notion of (...) transformation offers content and direction for the notion of transformation central to many ecofeminist philosophies. These affinities offer possibilities for developing the relevance of both philosophies to bear upon a theoretical understanding of how we can live in a respectful and sustainable relationship with our natural environment. (shrink)

In his major work on love, Works of Love, Kierkegaard clearly and robustly affirms the moral superiority of neighbourly love, and approves preferential love on one condition: that it serve as an instance of neighbourly love. But can an essentially preferential love be an instance of the essentially non-preferential neighbourly love? John Lippitt seems to think it can. In his paper “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’ he defends Kierkegaard’s position in Works of (...) Love against my criticism (as presented in my book Kierkegaard on Faith and Love); specifically, against my claim that in using Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love as a framework for understanding preferential love, one fails to account for the latter’s distinctive character. Lippitt claims that I misinterpret Kierkegaard’s position and, using what he calls ‘the God filter’, he attempts to show how adhering to Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love allows one to sustain the distinctiveness (and value) of preferential love. In what follows I will defend my interpretation of Kierkegaard’s position and explain why I take the view he presents in Works of Love to be problematic. Furthermore, in my aforementioned book I offer a Kierkegaardian model of love that does precisely what Lippitt seeks his ‘God filter’ model to do: namely, preserve the distinctiveness of preferential love while allowing its possible coexistence with neighbourly love. Thus, against the background of Lippitt’s criticism I will demonstrate this model again, in hope of clarifying the advantages this view offers. (shrink)

The essays in this volume provide a state-of-the-art overview of the central elements of Hobbes's political philosophy and the ways in which they can be interpreted. The volume's contributors offer their own interpretations of Hobbes's philosophical method, his materialism, his psychological theory and moral theory, and his views on benevolence, law and civil liberties, religion, and women. Hobbes's ideas of authorization and representation, his use of the 'state of nature', and his reply to the unjust 'Foole' are also critically analyzed. (...) The essays will help readers to orient themselves in the complex scholarly literature while also offering groundbreaking arguments and innovative interpretations. The volume as a whole will facilitate new insights into Hobbes's political theory, enabling readers to consider key elements of his thought from multiple perspectives and to select and combine them to form their own interpretations of his political philosophy. (shrink)

Although Rawls insists that his argument for his theory of justice neither addresses nor requires that we settle in advance any of the deep questions of philosophy, there are nonetheless more subtle ways in which his work may bear on such questions. The article explores how Rawls’s work may advance our thinking on the general philosophical question of how language affects thought, by enabling us to assess the conceptual consequences of two alternative metaphors for describing our activity when we engage (...) in critical self-reflection. The effects on our thinking of our common use of the metaphor of ‘stepping back’ to describe this activity are contrasted with those of an alternative metaphor suggested by Rawls’s work. The resulting conclusions are then employed to illuminate Rawls’s reply to an interesting objection to his theory raised by Michael Sandel. (shrink)

Background Healthcare professionals face a myriad of ethical challenges during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. However, there is limited literature examining the ethical challenges faced by HCPs in low- and medium-income countries. The research was designed to explore the ethical challenges experienced by HCPs in a Malaysian hospital setting during the pandemic. Methods Semistructured interviews were conducted via video calls with 10 Malaysian HCPs across different clinical disciplines involved in managing patients diagnosed with COVID-19 infections. The calls were audio-recorded, transcribed (...) verbatim and checked. Thematic analysis with constant comparison across transcripts was carried out to identify categories and themes. Results Three main themes emerged. Firstly, there was deprioritisation of care for non-COVID-19 patients resulting from resource limitations. HCPs raised concerns that there was curtailed access to various healthcare services by non-COVID-19 patients. There was also a trade-off between protecting individual patient safety and public health interests. Secondly, patients were disempowered from decision-making; the decision to segregate suspected COVID-19 patients to high-risk areas without seeking patients’ approval may result in an increased risk of infection. Lastly, HCPs expressed internal conflicts when balancing the professional duty of care against concerns about contracting COVID-19 and spreading it to their family members. Conclusion The study highlighted ethical issues faced by HCPs in Malaysia during the pandemic. It underscores the need for clinical ethics consultation services in hospitals to navigate the various ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

There is at present, far too little empirical research into the actual decision-making process of Institutional Review Boards and it is sobering to be reminded by Robert Klitzman's article that while theoretical debates might rage and prove fertile ground for new theories and better ways of approaching research ethics; ethics committee members must try to make sense of these concepts and apply them in very practical situations.1 Klitzman provides important insights into the ….

I think that Alzheimer's disease and all neurological disabilities of this kind, degenerative conditions, are of the most intense intellectual interest and importance … because these people are taking us to places we would rather not think about and what these people have to say—to the degree that they can say anything at all—should teach us something about what a person is, what human identity is.What could it mean in general to say that possible ways to be a person can (...) from time to time come into being or disappear?What can we learn about the experience of dementia and about ways of being human when a poet describes her forgetting? My mother, the poet Shirley Kaufman, died in 2016 at the age of 93. She had... (shrink)

Realism and conventionalism generally establish the parameters of debate over universals. Do abstract terms in language refer to abstract things in the world? The realist answers yes, leaving us with an inflated ontology; the conventionalist answers no, leaving us with subjective categories. I want to defend nominalism — in its original medieval sense, as one possibility that aims to preserve objectivity while positing nothing more than concrete individuals in the world. First, I will present paradigmatic statements of realism and conventionalism (...) as developed by Russell and Strawson. Then, I will present the nominalist alternative as developed by William of Ockham. (shrink)

John Dewey was the greatest American philosopher of the twentieth century, and this novel traces a fictionalized version of his intellectual development. Although the plot is invented, the concepts and ideas that the story explores are the ones that Dewey was primarily concerned with, and the novel brings together the thinkers who most influenced him. -/- John Dewey was raised by a strict, puritanical mother who believed that he was his deceased brother reincarnated. The first John Dewey inexplicably threw himself (...) into a fire and died. Now John is burdened with his mother's declaration that he was brought back to do something special with his life; he just doesn't know what that is. When he discovers an opportunity to meet William James, the foremost philosopher of the nineteenth century, he jumps at the chance. He wants to ask James about his mother's theory of his life, and he ultimately finds himself at a philosophers' camp of sorts, having meaningful conversations with not just James but also Josiah Royce, Felix Adler, Henry Bergh, Charles Saunders Peirce, and Victoria Woodhull. Along the way, Dewey examines the philosophy of Pragmatism, as well as ideas about democracy and its impact on issues of social justice, including those concerning the rights of women, the poor, people of color, and even animals, but also, most notably for Dewey, of children. Dewey's ideas about what education should be were radically different from those that were accepted at the time, and he revolutionized the American educational system. -/- But that was all to come. This story examines the forces that set Dewey's course for the future—his awakening to the concepts and beliefs that would propel him to eminence later in his life. And in this story, Dewey gets to feel the first stirrings of love and to solve a murder mystery. The novel offers a fascinating look at the theories and beliefs of several important intellectual figures at the turn of the twentieth century while engaging readers in a compelling tale of curiosity and discovery. (shrink)

Be warned—in your journey through this volume you will encounter many true stories. Some will make you laugh, others could make you cry, and all are enough to thoroughly embarrass the authors. These stories would never be allowed to see the light of day if they did not open the door to important truths about love. The authors speak to you, sometimes in their own voices, sometimes through dialogue, and sometimes through fiction. You will recognize yourself in their struggles and (...) triumphs. -/- Can the good life be attained without true love? What is jealousy? Is it possible to be a feminist and a heterosexual lover at the same time? What is the logic of the lovers’ quarrel? Is rough sex immoral? Is pornography a great lover’s friend or a foe? What did Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, Russell, Beauvoir, and other great geniuses of Western history have to say about what goes on under the boardwalk? Is there any freedom in love? Is erotic desire a function of body or spirit? What is the best kind of love? Is there such a thing as a soul mate? You will have to face these questions and more when you dare to ask what philosophy can tell you about your lover. -/- Everyone who has experienced it knows that romantic love truly is a “crazy little thing.” It keeps us awake at night and makes us do things we would never have dreamed we were capable of. -/- In this volume twenty-five philosophy professors are gathered together to discuss various connections between romantic love and philosophy. They have left their tweed jackets and spectacles behind. It is as though you have run into them by chance at a bar in some far away city where they are at ease, ready to tell you what they really think. -/- Perhaps you have taken a few philosophy classes, or perhaps you always kind of wanted to. This is your chance to enjoy some deep reflection on one of life’s greatest mysteries without any of the scholarly jargon, the academic pretenses, or the impossible exams. This volume will explain the lasting value of their ideas in simple, modern terms without the use of a single footnote. (shrink)

There are individual and cultural differences in how memories of our emotions are cognitively represented. This article examines the cognitive representation of emotions in different cultures, as a result of emotional (in)consistency in different cultures. Using a continuous semantic priming task, we showed in two studies that individuals who were less emotionally consistent across relationships have stronger associations of their emotions within those relationships. Further, we found (in Study 2) that in a culture characterised by higher levels of emotional inconsistency (...) across relationships (Singapore), stronger associations between emotions within relationships were found than in a culture characterised by emotional consistency (USA). This cultural difference in cognitive representation was fully mediated by individual differences in cross-situational consistency levels. (shrink)